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STRAW AND NOMINEE CORPORATIONS IN
REAL ESTATE TAX SHELTER
TRANSACTIONS
STEVEN J. STOGEL* AND DAVID L. JONES**
I. INTRODUCTION
During 1976, Congress placed some severe restrictions on tax shelter
investments.' In addition, even before Congress acted, the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) initiated its own attack on tax shelters. One
IRS tactic to frustrate the objectives of tax shelter investments is to shift
the incidence of taxation from one entity to another. This Article fo-
cuses primarily on one phase2 of the IRS attacks on real estate tax shel-
ters.'
* Member of the Missouri Bar. B.A., 1970, Clark University; J.D., 1973, Wash-
ington University.
** Member of the Missouri Bar. B.A., 1970, University of Arkansas; J.D., 1973,
LLM., 1977, Washington University.
The authors wish to thank Ronald J. Raben, Esq., for his assistance in the preparation
of this article.
1. See Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, §§ 201-14, 90 Stat. 1525
(1976).
2. See generally 22 U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Nov. 29, 1976, at 35, in which
IRS Commissioner Donald C. Alexander indicated the unyielding stance the IRS has
adopted against tax shelters. Alexander stated that the IRS is presently challenging
$300 million in tax sheltered investments in over 300 court cases.
The Internal Revenue Service has asserted that a limited partnership with suffi-
cient corporate characteristics should be taxed as an "association" within the meaning
of LR.C. § 7701 and the corresponding regulations. This approach would deny the
partners a deduction for their distributive losses and shift the losses to the corporation,
which probably would not be in a position to use them. To date, the Commissioner
has been unsuccessful in this approach. See, e.g., Zuckman v. United States, 524 F.2d
729 (Ct. Cl. 1975); Larson v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 159 No. 1 (April 27, 1976).
For a thorough discussion of the above approach, see Mendenhall & Ferguson, What
Risks Now for Partnership Treatment of Shelters? Lessons of Larson, Zuckman, 45
J. TAX. 66 (1976).
The IRS has not given up the fight, however. On January 5, 1977, the IRS released
proposed regulations which, if adopted, would have radically altered the § 7701 tests
to determine whether an entity qualifies as a partnership or a corporation. See 42
Fed. Reg. 1038 (1977). The proposed regulations were ordered withdrawn by Secretary
of the Treasury William Simon on the same date. See [1977] 6 FED. TAXES (P-H)
60,049. As this Article goes to press, it is unknown whether these regulations will
ever be proposed for public comment and possible adoption.
3. Many other business ventures have been used as tax sheltered investments, such
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In the normal course of the development of a real estate project, a
taxpayer, whether an individual or partnership ("real taxpayer"), 4 ac-
quires land, engages engineers and architects, obtains interim and per-
manent financing, secures appropriate zoning and building permits, lets
construction contracts, and builds the project. Occasionally, however,
the real taxpayer uses a straw corporation to transact one or more of the
project's developmental phases. A "straw" corporation is a corporate
entity created to hold record legal title for the beneficial owner of the
real estate. The real taxpayer may use a straw corporation in order to
limit his personal liability,5 avoid restrictive usury laws0 or government
regulations, 7 or simply because of personal convenience," inadvertence,
or ignorance. In such a situation the straw corporation might, for
example, acquire and hold title to the real estate or obtain a loan in
its name. Although the straw corporation participates in developing
the project, the real taxpayer treats himself as sole owner of the project
as cattle feeding, cattle breeding, various agricultural crops, thoroughbred horseracing,
oil and gas drilling, equipment leases, motion picture production, and professional sports
franchises. The Tax Reform Act of 1976 limits the taxpayer's deduction to the amount
he has "at risk" in activities such as motion picture production and distribution, farming,
leasing of section 1245 property, and exploration of oil and gas resources, but the "at
risk" limitation does not apply to real estate ventures. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub.
L. No. 94-455, § 204(c), 90 Stat. 1531 (1976) (to be codified in 26 U.S.C. § 465(c)).
Recent commentaries on this subject include Baker & Rothman, Straw Corporations
New Cases Shed Light on Tax Recognition Criteria, 45 J. TAX. 84 (1976); Baker &
Rothman, Nominee and Agency Corporations: Grasping for Straws, 33 N.Y.U. INST.
ON FED. TAX. 1255 (1975); Bertane, Tax Problems of the Straw Corporation, 20 VILL.
L. Rnv. 735 (1975); Hoffman, Straw or nominee corps. must be as passive as possible to
protect investors deductions, 5 TAX. FOR LAw. 10 (1976); Wright, Owning Real Estate
Through Shams and Nominees, 6 REAL ESTATE REv. 53 (1976). Two excellent older
articles are Kronovet, Straw Corporations: When Will They Be Recognized; What Can
and Should Be Done, 39 J. TAx. 54 (1973), and Kurtz & Kopp, Taxability of Straw
Corporations in Real Estate Transactions, 22 TAX LAw. 647 (1969).
4. Throughout this article, the term "real taxpayer" is used synonymously with
the term "real party in interest." The authors recognize that the phrase "real taxpayer"
reveals their protaxpayer attitude. Considering the tax consequences of tax shelters,
however, it is invariably the individual in a high income tax bracket who actively seeks
the losses, not the entity through which the investment may have been made or held.
In many other areas of income taxation, the general rule is that the substance of the
transaction, not its form, is controlling. See note 87 infra and accompanying text.
5. See, e.g., Stillman v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 897 (1973); H. HENN, LAWv or
CORPORATIONS § 73 (2d ed. 1970).
6. See, e.g., Rogers v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 1254 (1975); Bolger v.
Commissioner, 59 T.C. 760 (1973).
7. See, e.g., Elot H. Rafferty Farms, Inc. v. United States, 511 F.2d 1234 (8th
Cir. 1975); Waterman v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 910 (1975).
8. See, e.g., Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436 (1943); Salmon
v. Commissioner, 126 F.2d 203 (2d Cir. 1942).
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for federal income tax purposes. He reports the gains and losses
realized from the project, claims deductions for interest, taxes, and
depreciation, and capitalizes other expenditures that increase his basis
in the project.9 After completing the project, he liquidates the straw
corporation and transfers title to the project to himself, if the corpora-
tion held record legal title to the real estate.
In essence, the IRS's position is that the straw corporation, because
of its active role in developing the project, is the actual taxpayer and
should report any income and gains and deduct any expenses and losses
realized from the project. Acceptance of the IRS's position shifts sev-
eral tax consequences of the project from the real taxpayer to the straw
corporation. First, attributing expenses and losses to the straw corpora-
tion increases the real taxpayer's taxable income dollar for dollar in the
amount of the losses reallocated to the straw corporation. This results
in a larger income tax for the real taxpayer,1" and shifts any losses to
the straw corporation, which typically cannot use them as effectively as
the real taxpayer. Second, if the IRS treats the straw corporation as
the actual taxpayer, it may also treat any distributions from the straw
corporation to the real taxpayer as dividend income, return of capital,
or gain from the sale or exchange of property. 1 In addition, the real
taxpayer may be forced to recognize any gain he realizes upon dissolu-
tion or liquidation of the straw corporation. 2 Finally, the real taxpayer
9. Organizational and development costs, engineering and architectural expenses,
and other capital expenditures are added to the basis of the capital asset with respect
to which they are incurred. These expenses cannot be deducted as "ordinary and neces-
sary," either as business expenses under I.R.C. § 162, or as expenses of "management,
conservation, or maintenance" under I.R.C. § 212.
10. Since most investors in tax shelters are high tax bracketed taxpayers, the result-
ing tax to the real taxpayer is usually fifty percent or more of the dollars shifted from
the real taxpayer to the straw corporation. The Internal Revenue Service, pursuant to
I.R.C. § 6601, also adds an interest charge to the amount of the determined tax defi-
ciency. In addition, the IRS may seek to impose penalties on the corporation for failure
to file its tax returns and pay the tax. See, e.g., Paymer v. Commissioner, 150 F.2d
334 (2d Cir. 1945).
11. I.R.C. §§ 301, 312, 316. See, e.g., Collins v. United States, 386 F. Supp. 17
(S.D. Ga. 1974), aff'd per curiam, 514 F.2d 1282 (5th Cir. 1975). For a thorough
discussion of whether distributions from a corporation should be treated as dividends,
returns of capital, or gains from sale or exchange of property, see BrrrxER & EUSTICE,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS ch. 7 (3d ed. 1966).
12. See generally I.R.C. § 302 (redemptions) and I.R.C. § 331 (partial and com-
plete liquidations). In the case of certain liquidations, if the shareholders make an
election under I.R.C. § 333, the gain may not be recognized. See I.R.C. § 333. A
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may lose the advantage of the investment tax credit l and accelerated
depreciation methods. 4
This Article will explore the history and legal foundation of the
IRS's present position, outline alternative arguments that can be raised
by a real taxpayer involved in an IRS audit, and suggest possible tax
planning considerations.
11. DISREGARD OF THE STRAW CORPORATION
Historically, the real taxpayer has argued that he should be treated
as sole owner of the project for tax purposes and that the IRS should
disregard 5 the straw corporation because the corporation's activities
were minimal. Under the principle enunciated by the Supreme Court
in Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner,'6 however, courts normally
do not disregard corporate entities because "[tihe doctrine of corporate
entity fills a useful purpose in business life.' 7
Thompson, the real taxpayer in Moline, organized Moline Proper-
ties, Inc. in 1928 as a security device in connection with his Florida
real estate. The mortgagee of his real estate suggested that Thomp-
son transfer all his real property to the corporation, which would assume
the outstanding mortgages on the property. Thompson therefore trans-
ferred the property to Moline Properties, Inc. in exchange for all of
its stock, and then transferred the stock to a voting trustee appointed
straw corporation would not want to so elect because to do so would be inconsistent
with the straw corporation's position that it is a mere conduit for the real taxpayer. Sev-
eral options are available to the shareholders when distributing the assets of the straw
corporation. At the time the straw corporation is challenged, however, the assets usually
have been distributed to the real taxpayer and those options are already foreclosed.
It should also be noted that when appreciated property is transferred to a corporation
for any purpose, the appreciation is not recognized at the time of the transfer to the
corporation, but may be recognized when the corporation subsequently transfers the
property, I.R.C. § 311(d).
13. When the real taxpayer reacquires the real property, he may not be considered
"first user" of the property and therefore may be precluded from claiming the investment
tax credit. I.R.C. § 48(b). See also I.R.C. § 48(c) and Treas. Reg. § 1.48-3 (1964),
relating to whether limited investment credit is available for "Section 38 property."
14. See, e.g., I.R.C. H9 167(j), (k). See generally 4 L MERTENs, LAW OF FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION § 23 (1973).
15. The term "disregarded" in this article is synonymous with the word "ignored."
A corporation which is not disregarded is a separate entity and will be recognized as
such for federal income tax purposes.
16. 319 U.S. 436 (1943).
17. Id. at 438.
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by his mortgagee and other creditors. From 1928 to 1933, Moline
Properties assumed certain of Thompson's obligations, instituted a law-
suit to remove restrictions on its real property, and defended several
condemnation proceedings. Thompson paid all expenses incurred by
Moline Properties in connection with the lawsuits and condemnation
proceedings. In 1933, after Thompson caused the mortgages to be
satisfied, the trustee transferred the stock of Moline Properties to
Thompson. The corporation continued to exist, and in 1934 it leased
one of its lots and initiated a sales program to sell its real property. On
its 1934 and 1935 corporate income tax returns, Moline Properties
reported a loss and a gain, respectively, from the sale and operation
of its real estate. By 1936, the corporation had sold all the real estate,
and had substantial gains on the sales made in 1936. During its exist-
ence, the corporation kept no books, maintained no bank accounts, and
owned no assets other than the real property described above.18
Upon the advice of his accountant, Thompson filed a claim in 1936
for a refund of income taxes paid by the corporation in 1935, asserting
that Moline Properties should be disregarded for tax purposes and the
gain on the sales of property taxed to him personally. Thompson also
treated the substantial gain from the 1936 real estate sales as his per-
sonal gain. The Commissioner argued that Moline Properties was a
separate taxable entity that should be taxed on the gain from the sales,
and that Thompson had received dividends when Moline Properties
distributed money and property to him. The Supreme Court accepted
the Commissioner's position and refused to disregard the corporation
for tax purposes. The Court found that Moline Properties gave
Thompson special advantages,19 and was not his alter ego. The Court
reasoned:
Whether the purpose be to gain an advantage under the laws of the state
of incorporation or to avoid or to comply with the demands of creditors
or to serve the creator's personal or undisclosed convenience, so long as
that purpose is the equivalent of business activity or is followed by the
18. Id. at 437-38.
19. The taxpayer in Moline argued that Thompson's creditors coerced him to form
the corporation. The Supreme Court concluded that this argument merely emphasized
the taxpayer's separate and distinct existence, and also supported a finding that creation
of the corporation conferred advantages on Thompson. Having accepted the advantages
the corporation offered, Thompson was also forced to accept the tax disadvantages. See
notes 34-36 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the agency aspects of the
Moline case.
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carrying on of business by the corporation, the corporation remains a
separate taxable entity.20
A literal reading of Moline suggests a disjunctive test for determining
whether a corporation's existence will be disregarded. Under this test,
a corporation is a separate taxable entity if its purpose is: (1) a busi-
ness purpose which "is the equivalent of business activity;" or (2) a
business purpose which "is followed by the carrying on of business."2
Over the years, this test has been abbreviated to (1) business purpose
or (2) business activity.22
In nearly all post-Moline cases in which the issue was raised,28 the
straw corporations had engaged in substantial business activity,24 and
20. 319 U.S. at438-39.
21. Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436, 439 (1943).
22. Rogers v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 1254, 1256 (1975).
23. Prior to Moline courts struggled with the question of when to disregard a cor-
poration for federal income tax purposes, but did not develop a uniform principle of
law. For cases prior to 1943 holding that the corporation was a distinct and separate
entity, see, e.g., New Colonial Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435 (1934) (purchasing cor-
poration not disregarded and could not deduct the net loss carryovers of the purchased
corporation); and Burnet v. Commonwealth Improvement Co., 287 U.S. 415 (1932)
(corporation which had sold stock to an estate and had filed corporate income tax re-
turns on its business transactions not disregarded).
For cases prior to 1943 holding that a corporation would be disregarded, see, e.g.,
Southern Pac. Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 330 (1918) (corporate tax status ignored where
another corporation owned all the taxpayer corporation's outstanding shares, property,
and funds, and dominated its affairs and operations); United States v. Brager Bldg. &
Land Corp., 124 F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1941) (corporate tax status ignored where corpora-
tion held title to real estate for a partnership); Inland Dev. Co. v. Commissioner, 120
F.2d 986 (10th Cir. 1941) (corporate tax status ignored where corporation's only ac-
tivity was holding of a lease to oil producing property); North Jersey Title Ins. Co.
v. Commissioner, 84 F.2d 898 (3d Cir. 1936) (corporate tax status ignored where cor-
poration was formed merely to protect another corporation from publicity and was oper-
ated as a division of that corporation); 112 West 59th Street Corp. v. Helvering, 68
F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1933) (corporate tax status ignored where corporation held title
to property merely to facilitate resale during actual owner's absence); Carling Holding
Co. v. Commissioner, 41 B.T.A. 493 (1940) (corporate tax status ignored where corpo-
ration was formed to hold title to real estate during foreclosure); Mayer v. Commis-
sioner, 36 B.T.A. 117 (1937) (corporate tax status disregarded where corporation held
title to real estate for a partnership).
24. See, e.g., Strong v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 12 No. 1 (April 5, 1976). The
straw corporation held record title to the assets, granted easements, obtained an insur-
ance policy on the building, named itself as the insured, and negotiated loans.
See also Elot H. Rafferty Farms, Inc. v. United States, 511 F.2d 1234 (8th Cir. 1975)
(straw corporation held record title to assets, defended a law suit, maintained its own
books and records, managed property, collected rent, negotiated loans, executed leases
in its own name, and held itself out to the public as a separate entity); Taylor v. Coin-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1976/iss3/2
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the courts refused to disregard them for tax purposes; 25 in only four
cases were the straw corporations' activities so insubstantial that they
could be disregarded. 26  Thus, despite occasional success by the real
taxpayer, the courts have been quite reluctant to disregard straw corpo-
rations. The following four cases, decided recently by the Tax Court,
demonstrate that courts will almost invariably recognize straw corpora-
tions for tax purposes.
In Preferred Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner,17 the real taxpayer,
Mr. Kline, owned all the stock of the straw corporation, Preferred Prop-
erties, Inc. The corporation held title to real estate, borrowed money,
missioner, 445 F.2d 455 (1st Cir. 1971) (straw corporation held record title to assets,
established corporate checking account, executed deed and mortgage, collected receipts,
negotiated and made loans, and held itself out to the public as a separate entity); Thom-
linson v. Miles, 316 F.2d 710 (5th Cir. 1963) (straw corporation held record title to
assets, established corporate checking account, sold timber in its own name, negotiated
sales of land, paid taxes, received purchase money security deed and release of the se-
curity deeds); Harrison Property Mgmt. Co. v. United States, 475 F.2d 623 (Ct. Cl.
1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1130 (1974) (straw corporation held record title to assets,
established a corporate checking account, joined with individuals in law suits, maintained
corporate books and records, collected rent, executed leases, and held corporate meet-
ings).
25. See, e.g., Elot H. Rafferty Farms, Inc. v. United States, 511 F.2d 1234 (8th
Cir. 1975); Taylor v. Commissioner, 445 F.2d 455 (1st Cir. 1971); Britt v. United
States, 431 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1970); Greer v. Commissioner, 334 F.2d 20 (5th Cir.
1964); Thomlinson v. Miles, 316 F.2d 710 (5th Cir. 1963); Hagist Ranch, Inc. v. Com-
missioner, 295 F.2d 351 (7th Cir. 1961); Commissioner v. State-Adams Corp., 283 F.2d
395 (2d Cir. 1960); Collins v. United States, 386 F. Supp. 17 (S.D. Ga. 1974), aff'd
per curiam, 514 F.2d 1282 (5th Cir. 1975); Harrison Property Mgmt. Co. v. United
States. 475 F.2d 623 (Ct. Cl. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1130 (1974); Carver v.
United States, 412 F.2d 233 (Ct. Cl. 1969); Strong v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 12 No.
1 (April 5, 1976); Simpson v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 710 (1976); Preferred
Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 68 (1976); Rogers v. Commis-
sioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 1254 (1975); Stillman v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 897 (1973);
Bolger v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 760 (1973); Bass v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 595
(1968); Weigman v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 596 (1967); Siegel v. Commissioner, 45
T.C. 566 (1966); Sas-Jaworsky v. Commissioner, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 630 (1965), affd
per curiam, 379 F.2d 337 (5th Cir. 1967); Rothafel v. Commissioner, 24 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1524 (1965); Pollack v. Commissioner, 23 T.C.M. (CCH) 433 (1964); Pickus
v. Commissioner, 22 T.C.M. (CCH) 1791 (1963); Barker v. Commissioner, 22 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1649 (1963); Nutt v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 231 (1962); Estate of Lichstein
v. Commissioner, 21 T.C.M. (CCH) 1335 (1962); Caswal Corp. v. Commissioner, 19
T.C.M. (CCH) 757 (1960); K-C Land Co. v. Commissioner, 19 T.C.M. (CCH) 183
(1960).
26. See, e.g., Noonan v. Commissioner, 451 F.2d 992 (9th Cir. 1971); Paymer v.
Commissioner, 150 F.2d 334 (2d Cir. 1945); Steinmetz v. Commissioner, 32 T.C.M.
(CCH) 969 (1973); Davis v. Commissioner, 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 749 (1970).
27. 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 68 (1976).
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executed mortgages, and defended a lawsuit. In a memorandum
opinion, the Tax Court summarily concluded that Preferred Properties,
Inc., was a real entity that would not be disregarded for tax purposes.
The real taxpayer in Strong v. Commissioner28 used the straw
corporation, Heritage Village Apartments Co., to avoid New York's
usury law limitations. The corporation's articles of incorporation stated
broad corporate purposes. During its existence, the corporation exe-
cuted numerous mortgages and financing documents. Certain internal
documents of the real taxpayer, a partnership, recognized the use of
a straw corporation. The straw corporation filed its tax return on a
basis consistent with the partnership's; the corporation did not report
any income or claim any losses. The Tax Court held that the straw
corporation would not be disregarded in those circumstances.
In Bolger v. Commissioner,29 the corporation in the space of one day
acquired a piece of real estate in its name; made a lease with a solvent
lessee; sold for the price of the purchased property its own interest-
bearing negotiable corporate note to an institutional lender who agreed
to collect the rent and simultaneously reduce the mortgage note; and
conveyed the property to its shareholders for $1.00. The transaction
was designed to avoid state usury law restrictions, limit certain individu-
als' personal liability, and facilitate multiple-lender financing. The in-
dividual shareholders, who were the real taxpayers, argued that the cor-
poration should be disregarded for tax purposes. The Tax Court, in an
opinion considered by the full court, concluded that the corporation's
28. 66 T.C. 12 No. 1 (April 5, 1976). By a letter dated August 1976, the authors
have been advised that this case is being appealed to the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals.
Unfortunately, the terminology used by the Tax Court in Strong is somewhat different
than the terminology used in this article. The Strong Court used the word "nominee"
to describe what this article refers to as a "straw" corporation.
A careful reading of the opinion in Strong and the briefs submitted to the Tax Court
reveal that the taxpayer did not advance an agency argument. Although some favorable
indices of agency were present, the taxpayer's sole argument was that the corporation
should be disregarded.
Another significant fact in Strong is that the real taxpayers, partners of a partnership,
individually owned the straw corporation. Thus, even if an agency argument had been'
advanced, the real taxpayer probably could not have demonstrated that the principal-
agent relationship was independent of the principal's controlling stock interest in the
purported corporate agent. See notes 65 & 66 infra and accompanying text.
29. 59 T.C. 760 (1973). The ultimate result in Bolger was favorable to the tax-
payer, but was based upon a theory other than disregard of the straw corporation. For
a comprehensive discussion of the case, see Lurie, Bolger's Building: The Tax Shelter
That Wore No Clothes, 28 TAx LAw RFv. 355 (1973).
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activities were sufficient to constitute "business activities followed by a
valid business purpose," and that the corporation could not be disre-
garded. The court reached this result notwithstanding the fact that all
the corporation's activities occurred on one day, whereas in previous
cases the corporate activities extended over a period of time.
The real taxpayer in Rogers v. Commissioner"° created a straw
corporation, Armadillo Investment Co., to obtain a loan at an in-
terest rate which would have been usurious under Missouri law if
made to an individual. 31 In connection with obtaining the loans, Arma-
dillo renegotiated renewal loans, loaned money to another corporation,
maintained bank accounts, and filed the required state corporate infor-
mational reports. The Tax Court, in a memorandum opinion, con-
cluded that these activities warranted recognition of the corporation as
a separate taxpayer, despite the corporation's minimal activities. Most
corporations file state informational returns of some kind,3 2 and
Armadillo's only other activities consisted of obtaining loans and main-
taining a bank account to facilitate the loans.
The Rogers holding that the quantum of corporate activity is not
controlling, and the Bolger conclusion regarding activities confined to
a single day, indicate that one substantial business transaction is suffi-
cient to cause a straw corporation to be recognized as a separate tax-
payer for federal income tax purposes.
III. NOMINEE CORPORATIONS
Because courts invariably recognize straw corporations for federal
income tax purposes, the real taxpayer who desires or needs to use a
30. 34T.C.M. (CCH) 254 (1975).
31. Missouri law, Mo. REv. STAT. § 408.030 (1969), provided that the maximum
interest rate chargeable to an individual was eight percent per annum. On January
1, 1975, the limit was raised to ten percent. Even before the new provision became
effective, however, corporations were not subject to maximum interest rates in their bor-
rowings, and corporate vehicles for borrowing money were used extensively in Missouri,
particularly during the high interest periods of 1973 and 1974. See notes 92-94 infra
and accompanying text for discussion of the effect of repeal and amendment of usury
law limitations.
32. In Missouri, for instance, a corporation must annually file a franchise tax re-
turn, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 147.010 (Vernon Supp. 1976), and an annual registration form,
Mo. ANN, STAT. § 351.120 (Vernon Supp. 1976), to maintain its corporate standing.
Also, federal law requires a corporation to file an income tax return. I.R.C. § 6012(a)
(2). The suggestion that any corporation that files tax returns to comply with state
and federal law must be recognized for tax purposes places far too much emphasis on
the form, and ignores the substance, of the transaction.
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corporation to develop a real estate project or similar tax sheltered
investment should consider a different approach. An alternative that
may preserve the desired tax consequences is a nominee corporation.
A nominee corporation differs from a straw corporation in that the
former is conceded to be a recognized entity for federal income tax
purposes, but is characterized as an agent of the real taxpayer.83
A. National Carbide
Thompson, the sole shareholder in Moline,84 also argued that Moline
Properties, Inc. should be disregarded for tax purposes because the cor-
poration was his identity in a different form, or was his agentY8 The
Supreme Court rejected this argument, however, observing that "there
was no actual contract of agency, nor the usual incidents of an agency
relationship. "36
The Court elaborated on this corporate agency concept in National
Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner.17  In National Carbide, three wholly-
owned subsidiaries of Air Reduction Corporation ("Airco") argued that
they were agents of Airco, and that the court should determine income
and excess profits taxes on that basis. Each subsidiary performed
major aspects of Airco's business and operated strictly in accordance
with a master contract with Airco. The contract provided that the sub-
sidiaries were employed as agents to produce and sell certain products.
The parent was to furnish capital, management, and officers for the
subsidiaries. The contract required each subsidiary to turn over to
Airco all profits in excess of six percent of the capital stock. The sub-
sidiaries held title to all assets, and the subsidiaries' books reflected all
capital advanced to them by Airco as accounts payable without interest.
The officers of the subsidiaries and the parent were identical, and the
33. In Schuh Trading Co. v. Commissioner, 95 F.2d 404, 411 (7th Cir. 1938), the
court stated:
The word nominee ordinarily indicates one designated to act for another as
his representative in a rather limited sense. It is used sometimes to signify an
agent or trustee. It has no connotation, however, other than that of acting
for another, in representation of another ....
For this reason, the word "nominee" is clearly appropriate to describe the context in
which a "nominee" corporation operates.
34. Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436 (1943). See notes 16-
20 supra and accompanying text.
35. Id. at 440.
36. Id.
37. 336 U.S. 422 (1949).
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subsidiaries' directors merely ratified the actions of Airco's officers and
directors.
The Commissioner argued that all income was taxable to the subsidi-
aries, whereas the taxpayers took the position that the income in excess
of six percent was Airco's. The Commissioner and the taxpayers
agreed that Moline, which had been decided six years earlier, required
taxation of a corporate entity engaged in business activity, unless the
corporation acted only as agent of its owner. The taxpayers, however,
argued that a corporate agency exists and that the corporate entity may
be disregarded for tax purposes when there is complete identity of
stock ownership and control between the subsidiary and parent corpo-
rations."8 The Tax Court agreed with the taxpayers.
Reversing the Tax Court's judgment, the Supreme Court held that
identity of ownership and control of two corporations does not establish
an agency relationship. 39 Emphasizing this point, the Court noted that
Airco's control of the subsidiaries was no different from Thompson's
control of Moline Properties; in both cases, control was achieved
through stock ownership.
Nevertheless, the Court stated that it was "necessary to go farther"
and to consider the corporate agency issue distinct from the identity
issue.4" Addressing the agency argument presented by the taxpayers,
the Court reasoned:
[T]he contracts between Airco and petitioners by which the latter agreed
to pay all profits above a nominal return to the former, [do not] on
that account, become "agency" contracts within the meaning of our deci-
sions .... Our decisions requir[e] that income be taxed to those who
earn it, despite anticipatory agreements designed to prevent vesting of
the income in the earners. . . . Of course one of the duties of a col-
lection agent is to transmit the money he receives to his principal accord-
ing to their agreement. But the fact that petitioners were required by
contract to turn over the money received by them to Airco, after deduct-
ing expenses and nominal profits, is no sure indication that they were
mere collection agents. Such an agreement is entirely consistent with
the corporation-sole stockholder relationship whether or not any agency
exists, and with other relationships as well.
38. 336 U.S. at 427.
39. Id. at 427-30. The Court stated, "ownership of a corporation and the control
incident thereto have no different tax consequences when clothed in the garb of an
agency rather than worn as a removable corporate veil." Id. at 430.
40. Id. at 430.
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What we have said does not foreclose a true corporate agent or
trustee from handling the property and income of its owner-principal
without being taxable therefor. Whether the corporation operates in the
name and for the account of the principal, binds the principal by its
actions, transmits money received to the principal, and whether receipt
of income is attributable to the services of employees of the principal
and to assets belonging to the principal are some of the relevant con-
siderations in determining whether a true agency exists. If the corpora-
tion is a true agent, its relations with its principal must not be depend-
ent upon the fact that it is owned by the principal, if such is the case.
Its business purpose must be the carrying on of the normal duties of
an agent.41
The Supreme Court concluded that Airco could not escape the
adverse tax consequences inherent in the structure of the transaction, 42
stating, "When we referred to the 'usual incidents of an agency relation-
ship' in the Moline Properties Case, we meant just that-not the
identity of ownership and control disclosed by the facts of this case. '48
Thus, a corporation wholly owned by the real taxpayer must be a true
corporate agent of the taxpayer in order to shift the incidence of taxa-
tion from itself to the real taxpayer.
Several cases subsequent to Moline and National Carbide presented
the sole question whether the corporation should be disregarded for
federal income tax purposes;44 these cases are irrelevant to determining
whether a corporation is a true corporate agent (i.e., a nominee corpo-
ration). In several other post-Moline and National Carbide cases, the
taxpayers argued that the corporation should either be disregarded or
characterized as a true corporate agent. 45 In each case, however, the
court rejected both arguments,40 holding that the corporation had en-
41. Id. at 435-37 (emphasis added).
42. The Court found that the taxpayers' agency argument in National Carbide con-
tained a fatal fallacy, i.e., Airco had attempted to avoid the burdens of principalship
in establishing this very arrangement. Id. at 438 n.21.
43. Id. at 439.
44. See cases cited note 25 supra.
45. See, e.g., Elot H. Rafferty Farms, Inc. v. United States, 511 F.2d 1234 (8th
Cir. 1975); Collins v. United States, 386 F. Supp. 17 (S.D. Ga. 1974), afI'd per curiam,
514 F.2d 1282 (5th Cir. 1975); Preferred Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M.
(CCH) 68 (1976); Rogers v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 1254 (1975).
46. The very fact that taxpayers' counsel were forced to argue both positions indi-
cates the weakness of both positions. The "disregard" concept and the agency concept
are mutually exclusive, and should never be advanced simultaneously. The taxpayer




gaged in too many activities to be disregarded, and that the taxpayer
had offered no proof that the purported agent was imbued with the
usual incidents of agency or had in fact acted as an agent.47
B. Test for Nominee Corporations
To demonstrate that a corporation is a true corporate agent when the
principal owns a controlling stock interest in the nominee corporation,
the nominee must prove both that (1) the usual incidents of an agency
relationship exist; and (2) the corporation's relations with its principal
are not dependent on the principal's ownership of a substantial part of
the corporation.4" Each component of this test must be analyzed and
understood independently.
National Carbide presented the question whether the subsidiaries
were "collection agents" of the parent, Airco. The Supreme Court
rejected the taxpayers' position, stating:
Of course one of the duties of a collection agent is to transmit the money
he receives to his principal according to their agreement. But the fact
that petitioners were required by contract to turn over the money
received by them to Airco, after deducting expenses and nominal profits,
is no sure indication that they were mere collection agents.49
It is critical to recognize that National Carbide dealt with only one
type of agent-a collection agent. Footnote 17 of National Carbide
refers to the Restatement"0 of Agency section 427, 1 which appears
47. Elot H. Rafferty Farms, Inc. v. United States, 511 F.2d 1234, 1239 (8th Cir.
1975); Collins v. United States, 386 F. Supp. 17 (S.D. Ga. 1974), aff'd per curiam,
514 F.2d 1282 (5th Cir. 1975); Simpson v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 710,
716 (1976); Preferred Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 68, 70
(1976); Rogers v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 1254, 1258 (1975).
48. Rev. Rul. 31, 1975-1 C.B. 10, 13. The Ruling states that "[i]n any case in
which a purported principal owns a controlling stock interest in its purported corporate
agent, whether an agency relationship will be recognized for Federal income tax pur-
poses is determined by reference to more than the presence of the usual incidents of
an agency relationship." (emphasis added). This statement gives rise to the interesting
negative inference that in a case in which a purported principal owns less than a con-
trolling stock interest, reference should be made to no more than the presence of the
usual incidents of an agency relationship. Thus, in a case in which a principal owns
less than a controlling stock interest, establishing a true corporate agency may require
only a demonstration of the "usual incidents of an agency relationship."
49. National Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner, 336 U.S. 422, 436 (1949) (emphasis
added).
50. The RSTATEMMNT OF AGENCY in effect in 1943 has been superceded by the
RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF AGENCY (1957).
51. RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY § 427 (1933) provides:
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under the general heading "Duties and Liabilities of Particular Kinds
of Agents." The Restatement mentions many kinds of agents-Agents
in Charge of Lands or Chattels,52 Agents Holding a Title,53 Agents
to Buy or Sell,54 Agents to Make Investments, 5 Agents to Make Collec-
tions, 6 Agents Who Have Made Collectionsr 7-but only one kind of
agency was involved in National Carbide. Only in the context of collec-
tion agents and the peculiar facts of National Carbide did the Supreme
Court focus on "some of the relevant considerations" 5 to the existence of
a true corporate agency. Those considerations included: (1) whether the
corporation operates in the name and for the account of the principal,
§ 427 AGENTS WHO HAVE MADE COLLECTIONS
The duties of an agent who has received goods or money for the principal de-
pend upon the agreement between them. Unless otherwise agreed, the agent
has a duty to use care to keep them safely until they are remitted or delivered
to the principal, and to deliver them to the principal upon his demand when
the amount due him has been ascertained. The agent may also have a duty to
use care to notify the principal of the collection, or to remit the goods or money
to him within a reasonable time.
RESTATEMNT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 427 (1957) provides:
§ 427 AGENTS WHO HAVE MADE COLLECTIONS
Unless otherwise agreed, an agent who has received goods or money for the
principal has a duty to use care to keep them safely until they are remitted or
delivered to the principal, and to deliver them to the principal upon his de-
mand when the amount due him has been ascertained. The agent may also
have a duty to use care to notify the principal of the collection, or to remit the
goods or money to him within a reasonable time.
52. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 422 (1957). This section could be di-
rectly applicable to a nominee corporation. The general rule of § 422 below is identical
to that contained in the first Restatement:
§ 422 AGENTS IN CHARGE OF LAND OR CHATTELS
Unless otherwise agreed, an agent who has charge of land or chattels for his
principal is subject to a duty to the principal to use reasonable care in their
protection, to use them only in accordance with the directions of the principal
and for his benefit, and to surrender them upon demand or upon the termina-
tion of the agency.
53. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 423 (1957) provides:
§ 423 AGENTS HOLDING A TITLE
Unless otherwise agreed, an agent who holds the title to something for the
principal is subject to a duty to the principal to use reasonable care in the pro-
tection of the title which he so holds, to act in accordance with the directions
of the principal, to use it only for the principal's benefit, and to transfer it
upon demand or upon the termination of the agency.
This provision is also applicable to the normal activities of a nominee corporation as
described in this Article.
54. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 424 (1957).
55. Id. § 425.
56. Id. § 426.
57. See note 51 supra.
58. National Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner, 336 U.S. 422, 437 (1949).
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binds the principal by its actions, and transmits money received to the
principal; and (2) whether receipt of income is attributable to the
principal's employees and assets.59  Most of these considerations
appear in the comments of section 427 of the Restatement; the others
derive from general rules of agency law. Since the Supreme Court
specifically stated that these were only "some of the relevant considera-
tions in determining whether a true agency exists," and since there are
many different kinds of agency, it should be evident that the considera-
tions stated in National Carbide do not control in every instance in
determining whether a corporation is a true corporate agent. In cases
involving corporate agents who are not collection agents, therefore,
other considerations, such as those cited in other sections of the Re-
statement of Agency, should control. For instance, a nominee corpora-
tion in a real estate venture could be characterized according to the
rules and comments under section 422 or section 423 of the Restate-
ment.60
In determining whether the "usual incidents" or "normal duties" of
an agency relationship exist,"1 therefore, the particular type of agency
must be carefully scrutinized. The corporation's status as an agent
should be determined on the basis of the entire law of agency, not just
the few factors62 listed in National Carbide. Any other conclusion
would completely misconstrue the facts and holding of National
Carbide.
The second component of the test for determining true corporate
agency is whether the corporation's relationship with its principal
depends upon its ownership by the principal.0 3 The IRS has ruled that
if the principal is sole owner or owns a controlling stock interest of the
agent, the agent's activities and its relationship to the principal must
be independent of the fact that it is owned by that principal. The IRS
stated in Revenue Ruling 75-31:
If a corporation is a true agent, its relations with its principal must not
be dependent upon the fact that it is owned in substantial part by the
principal. National Carbide Corporation v. Commissioner, 336 U.S.
422 (1949). The significant criteria that must be examined are
59. Id.
60. See notes 52 & 53 supra.
61. See note 48 supra and accompanying text.
62. See note 59 supra and accompanying text.
63. See note 48 supra.
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whether "the so-called 'agent' would have made the agreement if the
so-called 'principals' were not its owners, and conversely whether the
'principals' would have undertaken the arrangement if the 'agent' were
not their corporate creature." Harrison Property Management Co., Inc.
v. United States, 475 F.2d 623, 627 (Ct. Cl. 1973), cert. denied 414
U.S. 1130, reh. denied 415 U.S. 952 (1974). Thus, for a true agency
relationship to exist, it must be shown that the principal's control over
the corporation's functions in an agent's capacity rests on a relationship
independent of any control attributable to stock ownership.!4
Under the second component of the test, Moline, National Carbide,
Harrison,6r and Stillman66 were all properly decided against the tax-
payer, because in none of those cases was there a showing that the
respective corporations acted for independent reasons.
In Carver v. United States, 6 on the other hand, the taxpayer partially
fulfilled the second component of the agency test. In 1935, Carver,
a lawyer, and his client, Pipkin, joined together to purchase eight
hundred acres of real estate. Chase National Company, Inc., a cor-
poration owned entirely by Carver, took title to the real estate, obtained
a loan, and opened a bank account. Pipkin assumed responsibility for
payment of the loan with funds contributed by himself and Carver. In
1955, Pipkin negotiated a sale of the land, and the sale proceeds were
paid directly to Pipkin and Carver without going through Chase
National.
The Commissioner argued that Chase National should be recognized
as the actual taxpayer for federal income tax purposes. Carver took
the position that Chase National was the corporate agent of Carver and
Pipkin, and that the court should attribute the gain from the sale of
64. Rev. Rul. 31, 1975-1 C.B. 10, 13.
65. Harrison Property Mgmt. Co. v. United States, 475 F.2d 623 (Ct. Cl. 1973),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1130 (1974).
66. Stillman v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 897 (1973). It is interesting to note that
in Stillman the principal (real taxpayer) was a general partnership consisting of four
partners, and the purported corporate agent was owned by three of those four general
partners. The partners' three-quarters interest in the corporate agent would probably
fall within the concept of "substantial" ownership specified in Revenue Ruling 75-31,
supra note 64. The Tax Court rejected the argument accepted by the Court of Claims
in Carver, see notes 67 & 68 infra and accompanying text, that if the corporation acted
as an agent for one nonowner general partner, it acted as an agent for all the partners.
In Stillman, the Tax Court concluded that the nonowner partner was only a "passive"
investor, not as "active" as Pipkin in the Carver case, and that the Carver logic was
inapplicable.
67. 412 F.2d 233 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
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the real estate to the real taxpayers. The Court of Claims held that
the corporation had acted as a true corporate agent of Carver and Pip-
kin, even though it was owned entirely by Carver, a principal:
Chase National was either the agent of or trustee for Mr. Pipkin, who
was admittedly not an owner or stockholder of Chase National. If that
relationship was valid for Mr. Pipkin, it must have been equally valid,
under all of the circumstances, for Mr. Carver.68
Of all the cases in which the real taxpayer relied on a theory of true
corporate agency, however, the taxpayer succeeded only in Carver, and
even in Carver the success was only partial.69 Thus, if the principal
owns all or a controlling stock interest of the purported corporate agent,
even if the relationship exhibits the "usual incidents of an agency rela-
tionship," the nominee corporation will probably be unable to prove
that its activities were unrelated to the stock ownership of its principal
(the real taxpayer).
The Tax Court has not explicitly held that it will always rule against
the owner-principal on the agency issue. In the Bolger7" case, how-
ever, the Tax Court stated that it could not find an agency relationship
because creation of a true agency relationship would have been "self-
defeating in that it would have seriously endangered, if not prevented,
the achievement of those objectives which. . . gave rise to the use of
the corporations, namely, the avoidance of restrictions under State
laws."71  This "self-defeating" notion, if broadly applied to all cases
presenting an agency argument, could effectively eliminate the use of
nominee corporations and completely erode National Carbide. Subse-
quently, in the Stillman case,72 the Tax Court discussed six relevant
facts that weighed against a finding that a corporation was a true corpo-
rate agent: (1) the intent to act as a nominee corporation developed
only after the real taxpayer (principal) was unable to develop the prop-
erty itself; (2) the corporate resolutions did not acknowledge an agency
capacity; (3) the parties had not executed an agency agreement; (4)
the nominee corporation engaged in substantial activity; (5) the real
taxpayer paid no compensation to the nominee corporation; and (6)
68. Id. at 240.
69. The Court of Claims held that Chase National was not a true corporate agent
when it acted exclusively for Carver for his personal investments. See notes 78-79 infra
and accompanying text.
70. 59 T.C. 760 (1973).
71. Id. at 766.
72. Stillman v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 897 (1973).
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the nominee corporation did not act as an agent for other parties.
Had these facts been favorably determined, the Tax Court presumably
might have concluded that the corporation in Stillman was a true cor-
porate agent, able to act on behalf of its owner-principal without shift-
ing the incidence of taxation from the owner-principal to itself.
The IRS has issued Revenue Ruling 75-31, 73 which recognizes the
existence of a true corporate agency under the following assumed facts:
X, a limited partnership organized under the laws of New York, owned
the project; D, a corporation, was managing general partner of and
owned a 1% interest in X. D organized H, a limited-profit housing
company, with nominal capital to receive a state loan for the project;
H was also a general partner of X. Under New York law a state agency
supervised the development and operation of the project, and the state
approved H's initial charter because the corporation served a public
purpose. H held title to the property, filed a Form 5674 annually, had
no interest in the profits or losses of X, and received no compensation
from X. The limited partners of X owned no stock in H.
The issue resolved by the Ruling was whether X would be treated as
owner of the project for federal income tax purposes; i.e., whether H
held title to the property as agent for X or on its own behalf. Apply-
ing the two-pronged test stated above, 7 the Ruling mentioned that (1)
H's certificate of incorporation and X's partnership papers, which specif-
ically acknowledged that H held title to the project on behalf of X,
and (2) noncontracting parties' knowledge of the existence of the
agency relationship (i.e., public record), revealed the usual incidents
of an agency relationship. Applying the second component of the test,
the Ruling concluded that H's activities did not depend on D's owner-
ship of H; rather, under New York law H's activities were controlled
by a state agency and by the contractual and legal obligations
inter sese.7 6
73. Rev. Rul. 31, 1975-1 C.B. 10.
74. A Form 56, Notice of Fiduciary Relationship, must be filed because an agency
relationship involves fiduciary duties. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Or AGENCY § 1 (1957).
75. See note 48 supra and accompanying text.
76. Baker and Rothman believe that this conclusion may be based at least partially
on the "peculiar nature of public housing financing transactions" and that the Ruling
may therefore be "of limited assistance to the taxpayer outside the public housing area."
Baker & Rothman, Straw Corporations: New Cases Shed Light on Tax-Recognition
Criteria, 45 J. TAx. 84, 87 (1976). Until the real taxpayer prevails in a court case
as in Carver, however, these Rulings represent the best current legal authority to validate
a true corporate agency.
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The Revenue Ruling is interesting because it presents a limited
factual pattern in which, because of state law, control of the agent is
vested in part in an entity other than its principal or its owner. The
Ruling is also important because it contains the Internal Revenue Serv-
ice's articulation of the test of true corporate agency, and its conclusion
that H was in fact a corporate agent of X.
In some cases, therefore, it is possible for the nominee corporation
to be recognized as a true corporate agent of the owner-principal. In
Carver,7 for example, the court held that Chase National acted as a
true corporate agent in the Carver-Pipkin transaction, even though one
of the real taxpayers owned 50% of Chase National's stock. Similarly,
in Revenue Ruling 75-31, D, owner of all the stock of the title-holding
corporation, H, was a 1 % partner of X. By comparison, in Stillman,
in which the real taxpayers failed to prove an agency relationship,
three of the four principal parties owned all the stock of the purported
corporate agent. The likelihood of a court recognizing a nominee cor-
poration as a true corporate agent for income tax purposes in an owner-
principal situation evidently increases as the extent of the principal's
ownership of the corporate agent decreases. 78 The principal who owns
a small or noncontrolling percentage of stock in the nominee corpora-
tion is more likely to satisfy the second component of the test: since
he cannot control the actions of the nominee corporation through stock
ownership, the nominee corporation's actions are much more likely to
appear independent.
C. Non-Owner-Principal Situations
The tax treatment of a nominee corporation in which the principal
owns no stock presents an interesting variation of the corporate agency
argument. Significantly, all the cases discussed above involved princi-
pals who owned at least some portion of the agents. In this context,
the Carver case is educational. In Carver, the alleged tax deficien-
cies arose out of transactions involving Carver alone or Carver and a
client jointly (e.g., the Pipkin transaction). Significantly, the Commis-
sioner did not assess deficiencies on the basis of transactions carried
out in the nominee corporation's name for Carver's clients.79 Carver,
77. Carver v. United States, 412 F.2d 233 (Ct. C1. 1969).
78. See note 48 supra.
79. 412 F.2d at 234, 240.
Number 3] 421
Washington University Open Scholarship
422 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1976:403
therefore, suggests that a nominee corporation wholly owned by a non-
principal need not meet the dual tests of true corporate agency estab-
lished in National Carbide and its progeny and articulated by the IRS
in Revenue Ruling 75-31.
Two approaches might be adopted to determine the real party in
interest in cases in which the real taxpayer owns no stock in the
nominee corporation. One such test can be inferred from Revenue
Ruling 76-26.11 Revenue Ruling 76-26 involved X, a limited partner-
ship organized under the laws of New York to build and operate a low
income housing project. X had three general corporate partners: M,
the managing partner; S, the nominally-capitalized corporation holding
title; and P, the sole shareholder of S. A state agency formed S for the
purpose of securing a loan, and transferred all the shares of S to P,
subject to a collateral pledge agreement and irrevocable proxy. Only
the limited partners made equity contributions to X; no limited partner
of X owned an interest in S, and the limited partners collectively
owned a 97% interest in X's profits, losses, income, gains, and credits.
M owned a 3 % interest in X, but neither S nor P held any interest in X.
The Ruling did not disclose the ownership of P. Neither X nor any of
the limited partners paid any compensation to S. Public declarations of
record disclosed S's capacity vis-a-vis X and that S would hold title to
the property for X. S annually filed a Form 56.
The pertinent issues presented in the Ruling were whether X or S
would be treated as owner of the project for federal income tax pur-
poses, and whether S held title to the project as an agent on behalf of
X or on its own behalf. Since P had no interest in the income, profits,
gains, losses, or credits of X, X was not an owner-principal of P or S.
Citing Revenue Ruling 75-31s two-step analysis "as applied to the in-
stant case,"81 Revenue Ruling 76-26 stated that the test is "(1) whether
evidence of [an] agency relationship exists between S and X, and if
so, (2) whether the relationship results merely from the stockholder
relationship between S and P."8, This test does not refer to the "usual
incidents of an agency relationship" or "independence" factors speci-
fied in Revenue Ruling 75-31. Instead, Revenue Ruling 76-26 seems
to set forth the less stringent standard of "evidence of an agency rela-
tionship;" apparently partnership papers and mutual acknowledgments





might suffice without proof of the "usual incidents" of agency. Fur-
thermore, the Ruling suggests a "merely from," as opposed to an "inde-
pendence" test, regarding control through stock ownership. Establish-
ing a true corporate agency relationship, therefore, would appear to be
easier under the standard set forth in Revenue Ruling 76-26 than under
the test enunciated in Revenue Ruling 75-3l1.1
A second possible test to govern non-owner-principal cases could be
derived from Connelly v. Commissioner.84 In Connelly, a case involv-
ing an individual acting as a nominee for another individual, the Tax
Court stated:
[W]e have found certain factors are helpful in deciding the factual issue
of who is the owner of property for tax purposes. These factors include
the intent of the parties, which party controlled and enjoyed the prop-
erty, and the financial stake of the parties.8 5
In Connelly, the taxpayer's son-in-law, Van Dyke, wanted to lease
800,000 acres of land in Alaska but understood that federal regulations
prohibited him from leasing more than 300,000 acres. To accomplish
his goal, therefore, he arranged for lease applications to be transferred
to Mrs. Connelly. Van Dyke and Mrs. Connelly agreed that she would
be merely the nominal owner of the property. Mrs. Connelly's only func-
tion with respect to the lease applications was to allow Van Dyke to
accomplish indirectly what he believed he could not do directly. Apply-
ing its test to these facts, the Tax Court found that Mrs. Connelly was
a nominee for the real taxpayer, Van Dyke:
Mrs. Connelly had no independent control over the lease applications;
nor did she enjoy any of the benefits derived from them. It was Mr.
Van Dyke who controlled the property, used it for his purposes, and
enjoyed the benefits therefrom. Every action Mrs. Connelly took with
respect to the applications was pursuant to a request from Mr. Van
Dyke. Every aspect of Mrs. Connelly's involvement in the transaction
was arranged, orchestrated, and implemented by Mr. Van Dyke.86
The tests promulgated in Revenue Ruling 76-26 and in Connelly make
sense. Both tests lessen the requirements for proving that a nominee
83. The authors have been informally advised, however, that the Internal Revenue
Service is interpreting Revenue Ruling 76-26 to require proof of "independence," and
that the Service is not relaxing the test of corporate agency as a result of Revenue
Ruling 76-26.
84. 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 1429 (1975).
85. Id. at 1431.
86. Id. at 1431-32.
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corporation is a true corporate agent in non-owner-principal situations,
and emphasize the substance rather than the form of the transaction.87
D. Weaknesses of Corporate Nominees
When a real taxpayer asserts an agency argument, the Commissioner
may counter by arguing that the principal-agent relationship is void.
The Commissioner might argue, for example, that if the principal
retains a corporate agent to perform an act (e.g., secure a loan)8" that
the principal could not have performed itself, or which would be illegal
if done by the principal, then the principal-agent relationship should
not be recognized for tax purposes.
This argument, although advanced by the Commissioner in prior
cases, 9 is unsound. In both Revenue Rulings 75-31 and 76-26, a cor-
poration secured a loan on behalf of a limited partnership which the
limited partnership itself could not have obtained. Thus, the Commis-
sioner has implicitly conceded in two Revenue Rulings the weakness
of any voidness claim. Furthermore, the Tax Court has already
rejected the argument that an agency relationship should not be
acknowledged where the agent's act would be illegal if done by the
principal. In Connelly, for example, the Tax Court concluded that
whether or not Van Dyke (the real taxpayer) had violated certain fed-
eral regulations was irrelevant for tax purposes. In other words, the
possible illegality of Van Dyke's conduct did not affect the tax result
of the transaction.9" Similarly, in Shaw v. Commissioner,91 the Tax
Court attributed income earned from insurance sales to the corporation,
even though state law prohibited corporations from selling insurance for
87. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). If the IRS succeeds in shift-
ing the incidence of taxation from a real taxpayer to a straw or nominee corpora-
tion, it in effect has elevated the form of the transaction over the substance. Assume,
for example, that a real estate project increases in value and is sold for a profit of
$1 million. The IRS's position leads to the conclusion that the stockholder of
the corporate agent (whether or not an owner-principal) is technically entitled to
the sale proceeds and the gain from the sale. This result, of course, is illogical and
unintended, because in reality the transaction was designed and intended to benefit the
owner-principal, not the stockholder of the corporate agent.
88. See, e.g., cases cited note 6 supra.
89. See, e.g., Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 139 F.2d 69 (9th Cir. 1943).
This argument has also been urged in an audit originating out of the St. Louis District
IRS office.
90. See notes 84-87 supra and accompanying text.
91. 59 T.C. 375 (1972). See also Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 139 F.2d
69 (9th Cir. 1943).
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commissions. Thus, the argument that the agency relationship is void
because of the impossibility or illegality of the act by the principal is
without merit.
The Commissioner is most likely to raise a voidness argument when
a nominee corporation secures a loan at an interest rate that would be
usurious to the real taxpayer. 2 If state usury laws have been repealed
or amended to permit such a loan to be made directly to the real tax-
payer, however, the real taxpayer can also rely on the doctrine of Ewell
v. Daggs.93 In Ewell, the Supreme Court upheld a judgment for the
entire interest on a promissory note which was usurious when made but
which would have been valid, due to repeal of the usury law, at the
time litigation began. The Supreme Court held that repeal of the usury
law operated retroactively to validate the entire transaction. Thus, if
usury law restrictions are repealed, the repeal generally operates retro-
actively to cut off the defense of usury and to render the entire loan
contract valid and enforceable from its inception.94
A word of caution may be necessary: The agency concept is not
without certain inherent disadvantages. First, if an agent secures a loan
or otherwise acts on behalf of the principal-real taxpayer, the principal
may be bound by the agent's acts and may face unexpected personal
liability.95 Second, a corporate agent, particularly one not controlled
through stock ownership, has the power to hypothecate or encumber
the principal's real estate and improvements, to the principal's obvious
financial detriment.
E. Planning the Use of a Corporate Nominee
Because of the unsettled law in this area, a taxpayer using a
nominee corporation has no assurance that he will obtain the desired
tax result. If he must use a nominee corporation (and he should do
so only as a last resort), the real taxpayer should adopt several initial
tax planning procedures to try to secure the desired tax consequences.9"
92. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
93. 108 U.S. 143 (1883).
94. 1d. at 150-51; 91 C.J.S. Usury § 10(b)(2) (1975); 73 Am. JLTR. 2D Statutes
ff 384, 388 (1974).
95. One obvious way to avoid liability on loans is to secure exculpatory financing.
Even if the real taxpayer asserts the corporation's nominee status for tax purposes, he
may have defenses against third parties who seek to bind him on an agency theory.
See U.C.C. § 3-401(1).
96. See sources cited note 3 supra.
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The following steps for planning and implementing the use of a nomi-
nee corporation are suggested as the best known means toward the de-
sired end:
1. The nominee corporation must be owned and operated by a
truly independent party who is not an owner-principal (real taxpayer).
2. No owner-principal should be a director or officer of the
nominee corporation.
3. The articles of incorporation of the nominee corporation should
limit its corporate purpose to the exclusive purpose of acting as an
agent.
4. Each shareholder of the nominee corporation should subscribe
for his stock and purchase it with his own funds. The corporation
should open a bank account in its name and pay its own legal and
accounting fees, franchise fees, and incorporation costs.
5. An agency agreement between the nominee corporation and the
principal must be prepared. The agreement should specify a fixed fee
for the nominee's services; this fee should be reasonable in light of the
services rendered. The agency agreement must include all the legal
requisites of a valid agency.97
6. The nominee corporation should file a Form 56 for each trans-
action, to notify the IRS of the fiduciary relationship.
7. The nominee corporation should apply for its own identification
number (Form SS-4), and state as the nature of its business (line 10)
"corporate agent and nominee."
8. The nominee corporation should file its own state and federal
income tax returns and other state corporate forms consistent with its
stated purpose.
9. The nominee corporation should pay salaries to its officers or
employees out of the income it receives for services rendered and file
all related information and forms.
10. Corporate resolutions and minutes should be drafted to reinforce
and support the corporation's actions as a corporate nominee and agent.
Only the proper officers of the nominee corporation should sign any
documents.
11. All monetary payments to third parties should come directly
from the principal for whom the nominee is acting. If this is impossible,
97. See notes 48-62 supra and accompanying text.
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the payment from the nominee corporation to the third party should
indicate the identity of the principal, and the nominee corporation's
books should reflect the principal's payment through the nominee cor-
poration to a third party.
12. The nominee corporation should promptly transfer any money
it receives to the principal; if this is not feasible, the nominee should
credit any receipts to the principal's account.
13. The nominee corporation should act in an agency capacity for
as many principals as possible.
14. Agency-related documents should be recorded, so that the pub-
lic has some knowledge of the agency relationship between the
nominee corporation and the real taxpayer. Revenue Ruling 75-31
emphasized this factor, but the public knowledge issue has not yet been
subjected to a court test.
1V. CONCLUSION
Under present law, courts will disregard straw corporations only un-
der highly unusual circumstances. If a corporate entity must be used
in real estate tax shelter transactions, a nominee corporation offers an
alternative to try to secure the desired tax benefits of the real tax-
payer's investment.
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